Michigan Law Review
Volume 54

Issue 5

1956

Future Interests - Trusts - Time for Ascertainment of Heirs After
Life Estate In Trust With Unexercised Power of Appointment and
No Gift in Default
Edward A. Manuel
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Edward A. Manuel, Future Interests - Trusts - Time for Ascertainment of Heirs After Life Estate In Trust
With Unexercised Power of Appointment and No Gift in Default, 54 MICH. L. REV. 708 (1956).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol54/iss5/13

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

708

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

FUTURE INTERESTS-TRUSTS-TIME FOR AsCERTAINMENT OF HEIRS AFrER
LIFE ESTATE IN TRUST WITH UNEXERCISED PoWER OF APPOINTMENT AND No
GIFT IN DEFAULT-The testator set up a testamentary trust for the benefit
of his wife for life and gave her a general testamentary power to appoint the
remainder in fee. No gift in default was provided. The life beneficiary died
without exercising the power. On petition by the trustee for directions for
the final distribution- of the trust property, the trial court held that the
property went to those who were the heirs of the testator at the time of his
death. On appeal, held, reversed, two judges dissenting. The trustees took
full title to the trust property and no interest in this property remained
in the testator's estate undisposed of by the will. When the life beneficiary
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died without exercising the power of appointment, the trust property reinvested in the testator's estate by virtue of a :resulting trust and descended to
those who were the heirs of the testator at the time of the death of the
life beneficiary. Butler v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 211 Ga. 414,
86 S. E. (2d) 520 (1955).
The old common law rule that "seizin is the stock of descent" necessitated the determination of the heirs at the end of the preceding freehold. 1
This rule.has been universally abrogated except in a minority of jurisdictions which hold that their statutes of descent and distribution do not apply to possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken.2
In the leading case of Blount v. Walker the South Carolina court drew an
analogy between a possibility of reverter after a fee conditional and a resulting trust after a fee simple in the trustee.8 Because that court was committed to the minority viewpoint concerning the descendability of possibilities
of reverter, it held that the time for ascertainment of heirs in the resulting
trust situation should be at the end of the preceding freehold. To the extent that this analogy to the possibility of reverter cases was relied upon
by the South Carolina court, the Blount case should not have been cited as
authority for the result reached in the principal case unless the Georgi~
court meant to abandon its past indication of alignment with the majority
viewpoint.4 In the principal case, the Georgia court based its decision on the
theory that, for the duration of the life beneficiary's equitable estate, all
other legal and equitable property interests remained vested in the trustees,
leaving nothing to vest in the heirs of the testator at the time of his death.
Therefore, it concluded, when the property returns by way of resulting
trust to the testator's estate at the time of the life beneficiary's death, it
descends to those persons who would have been the testator's heirs had he
died at that time. 6 Other courts have also used the existence of a fee in
1 Seizin was regarded as necessary for the descent of interests in land. Thus, if A,
possessing the fee interest, conveyed to B for life and thereafter died without having disposed of the reversion, it descended at the moment of the life tenant's death to the persons who would have been A's heirs had A died at that later time. This also applied to
remainders. 3 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §722 (1936). Cited in the past to support the result reached in the principal case was Conner Exr. v. Waring, 52 Md. 724 (1879). This
case was based upon the rule of seizin, and was overruled by Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md.
520, 39 A. (2d) 672 (1944).
2 Thus in the states that have adopted the minority point of view, these interests
are treated much IIS they were at common law. See 37 VA. L. REv. 117 (1951); 77 A.L.R.
344 (1932).
s 31 S.C. 13, 9 S.E. 804 (1888). This was a two to one decision with a strong dissenting
opinion pointing out that the trustee's interest ought not prevent the vesting of the reversionary interest. Cf. Waller v. Waller, 220 S.C. 212, 66 S.E. (2d) 876 (1951).
4 Cooper v. Davis, 174 Ga. 670, 163 S.E. 736 (1932).
IS Principal case at 420. The court apparently misinterpreted some loose language
in an adverse possession case [Cushman v. Coleman, 92 Ga. 772, 19 S.E. 46 (1893)] which
held that when the legal fee is in the trustee .an adverse possessor can cut off all legal
and equitable interests. The court in that case did not hold that the title to the equitable
remainder is in the trustee. In actuality, the case has very little relevance to the problem
in the principal case. Nor should the unexercised power of appointment have any effect.
Bienvenu v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 193 Ga. 101, 17 S.E. (2d) 257 (1941). See also
92 A.LR. 363 (1934).
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the trustees as a rationale for postponing the ascertainment of heirs. For
example, in In re Estate of Mooney the Nebraska court reasoned that since
the resulting trust arises at the end of the preceding freehold estate, the
heirs are determined at that time, arguing that the existence of the fee in
the trustees prevents intestacy until then. 6 A sounder approach to the problem was demonstrated by the Georgia court in Lane v. Citizens & Southern
National Bank.1 In that case, the court recognized that when the equitable
title is split from the legal title, it should be treated in equity just as the
legal title is handled at law. 8 On this basis, a more logical solution to the
problem in the principal case would be to recognize that although the entire legal estate is disposed of, the entire equitable or beneficial interest is
not. In other words, the testator, possessing both a legal and equitable fee
simple and having disposed of merely an equitable life interest, with a general power to appoint the full remainder by will, retains a vested equitable
reversion in fee subject to complete defeasance upon exercise of the power.
This reversion should be regarded as vesting in his heirs immediately upon
his death. A similar analysis has been made by a majority of the courts.9
·In addition, in view of the general ill repute of the old English doctrine of
seizin,10 the fact that the result under the theory of the principal case is
similar is not in its favor. Nor can the result be justified as a rule of intent.
The testator probably has not considered this contingency at all, or, if he
has, the fact that the trustee holds the legal fee cannot be considered any
indication of an intent to postpone the ascertainment of those who take as
his heirs. The best explanation of the result probably lies in the particular
facts of the case: by virtue of the decision the property descended to the
testator's brother instead of to his wife's twenty-five relatives.11 This is
probably justification enough.
Edward A. Manuel
6 131 Neb. 52, 267 N.W. 196 (1936). The courts are never too clear whether the word
"reversion" describes the act of the estate becoming reinvested in the grantor or the right
to this future enjoyment. The Nebraska court seems to ignore the latter meaning.
7 195 Ga. 828, 25 S.E. (2d) 800 (1943). In this case, a contingent remainder had failed
and the court held that the trust estate reverting to the estate of the testator should be
divided into six shares, the testator having died leaving six children. The widow of one
child who died before the life beneficiary, but after the testator, took a child's share as
the sole heir of her husband.
Bid. at 833.
9 The New Jersey court has stated that whenever it appears that the grantee or devisee
takes only the legal estate, the equitable interest that remains undisposed of goes to the
testator's heirs determined as of the testator's death. Mulford v. Mulford, 42 N.J. Eq. 68,
6 A. 609 (1886). In a well-considered opinion criticizing Blount v. Walker, note 3 supra,
as contrary to the weight of authority, the Rhode Island court reasoned that since the
resulting trust arises solely by operation of law and not by any intention of the testator,
the only persons who can take under a resulting trust are the heirs at law, these being
the persons who take immediately upon the death of the ancestor. The court concluded
that it is not critical in cases of this kind whether the heirs take a legal or only an
equitable interest. Champagne v. Fortin, 69 R.I. IO, 30 A. (2d) 838 (1943). See, generally,
27 A.L.R. (2d) 691 (1953).
10 3 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §723 (1936).
11 See also In re Estate of Mooney, 131 Neb. 52 at 57, 267 N.W. 196 (1936), for another
pragmatic application of this rule.

